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“A PERFECT (FREE-MARKET) WORLD?: ECONOMICS, THE EISENHOWER 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN LATIN 
AMERICA”1 
 
On January 16 1956, the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, “offered to expand 
diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, extend technical assistance, and conclude 
training arrangements with Latin American nations.”2 The next day, Bulganin told a 
reporter from Pravda that, “The Soviet Union... stands for the development of trade with 
countries of Latin America on the basis of mutual advantage.”3 This announcement was 
part of an ongoing shift in Soviet policy toward the developing areas of the world. In late-
January, President Dwight D. Eisenhower chided Bulganin for Moscow’s new approach, 
telling him that recent deteriorations in East-West relations were, “because to us it has 
seemed that your Government had, in various areas of the world, embarked upon a course 
which increases tensions by intensifying hatreds and animosities implicit in historical 
international disputes.”4  
Soviet actions were being driven by several factors: an ongoing internal dispute 
within the Kremlin over who should become the de facto leader of the Soviet Union; the 
continuing challenge that was being posed to Soviet supremacy in the communist bloc by 
Mao’s China; and, the changing nature of east-west tensions in the Cold War.5 This final 
point is especially instructive. With the situation in Europe more stable than at any time 
since 1945, the focus of American and Soviet officials had increasingly shifted toward 
the Third World.
6
 In fact, by 1955, both Moscow and Washington were beginning to see 
the emerging nations in the Third World as being crucial elements in the next phase of 
the Cold War. As Nikita Khrushchev’s rise to prominence in Moscow coincided with a 
more bellicose Soviet foreign policy,
7
 the U.S. was forced to reconsider its approach 
toward the Third World not just from an economic perspective, but from a strategic 
perspective, too.
8
 
Given this wider global trend, we might expect historians analyzing U.S. policy 
toward Latin America to have highlighted the Soviet Economic Offensive (SEO) as being 
a critical moment; the time when the evolving pattern of events in the bilateral 
relationship between Washington and Moscow emerged in the Western Hemisphere. And 
yet, this has not been the case, with scholars continually playing down the importance of 
the SEO on U.S.-Latin American relations.
9
 Indeed, scholars from opposite ends of the 
historiographical spectrum – like Stephen Rabe and James Siekmeier – have generally 
found common ground in downplaying the importance of the Soviet offer of economic 
and technical assistance.
10
 Typically, there are two reasons why this instance of overt 
Soviet intervention in Latin America has not been accorded more importance by existing 
studies. Firstly, the initial Soviet offer dissipated quite quickly, as the poor quality of 
Soviet industrial products and the fallout in Eastern Europe following Khrushchev’s 
secret speech in February 1956 made the Soviet offer seem less attractive.
11
 And 
secondly, U.S. policy is not perceived to have altered that significantly in the aftermath of 
the Soviet offer. Although there were some modifications made, they were not considered 
sweeping or wide-ranging enough to merit an in-depth investigation.
12
 This was not, 
however, a universal trend; more significant consequences were apparent in other areas 
of the world. In Indonesia, as Robert McMahon has recently noted, the Soviet Economic 
Offensive was one of the catalysts behind the Eisenhower administration’s ill-fated 
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attempt to overthrow the Sukarno regime in the late-1950s.
13
 But while no such dramatic 
events were apparent in Latin America, the impact of the SEO on the thinking of U.S. 
officials toward the region should not be overlooked. In fact, as Kenneth Osgood has 
contended, “Soviet efforts to expand trade and cultural contacts with Latin America…set 
off alarms about the danger of communist penetration.”14 
Contrary to the prevailing historiography, this article will suggest that the SEO 
was a significant moment. Not only did it mark the time when the U.S. began to 
consistently prioritize its strategic objectives in the region, but also, it began a process 
that would lead to more substantive changes in policy in 1958 and 1959 following the 
fallout from Richard Nixon’s tour of the region and the events of the Cuban Revolution.15 
Most importantly of all, however, it presented the Eisenhower administration with a stark 
choice in determining the future course of inter-American relations: namely, in facing up 
to the SEO should the U.S. dramatically alter its economic approach toward the region in 
order to make it immune from future Soviet incursions, or should a short-term solution 
based on meeting the immediate political threat be implemented? Eisenhower, backed by 
the majority of his advisors, chose the latter. According to officials throughout the 
administration, the Kremlin’s challenge could be rebuffed through a more successful 
implementation of existing U.S. economic policy, a wide-ranging attempt to promote and 
strengthen the ideal of intra-hemispheric co-operation through the Organization of 
American States (OAS), and a refined and improved form of military assistance. This 
‘new’ approach would be demonstrated at the Panama American Presidents Meeting in 
the summer of 1956, when Eisenhower would meet with the Latin American Heads of 
State and propose the formation of an Inter-American Committee of Presidential 
Representatives to discuss hemispheric economic relations. Yet if this was the high point 
of the response to the SEO, it was also its Achilles heel. Whilst it would prove to be 
successful at Panama in 1956, a year later, at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference, 
Washington’s adherence to traditional economic doctrine would cause a great deal of ill-
feeling amongst the Latin American nations, leading to a rise in nationalist sentiments 
and widening the divide between Latin American models for economic development and 
those being put forward by the U.S.
16
 Long-simmering tensions within U.S.-Latin 
American relations would be brought to the boil by the U.S. response to the SEO, thus 
making the changes that occurred toward the end of the Eisenhower era inevitable as the 
administration strove to react to ongoing developments. 
For underpinning the U.S. approach was an inherent difficulty: the assumption 
that the economic ideal of fostering development in the region through free market 
capitalism could be pursued successfully at the same time as quelling the influence of 
anti-American, nationalist or communist forces. This underlying predicament was 
outlined by the president’s Special Assistant, Nelson Rockefeller, at a National Security 
Council (NSC) Meeting in February, 1955. “Dictators in these [Latin American] 
countries are a mixed blessing,” Rockefeller stated. “It is true, in the short run, that 
dictators handle Communists effectively. But in the long run, the U.S. must encourage 
the growth of democracies in Latin America if Communism is to be defeated.”17 The 
problem – often unrecognized by U.S. officials – lay in trying to reconcile the economic 
ideals that governed Washington’s view of Latin American development with the 
strategic concerns highlighted by the shift in Soviet policy. Whilst these tensions had 
been apparent in U.S. policy before the SEO, they became endemic after 1956 when, as 
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Michael Adamson argues, “Moscow’s ‘economic offensive’...established a close 
connection between development and specific national security interests.”18  
In keeping with the central arguments relating to “Eisenhower Revisionism,” the 
present article will concur that the president was indeed at the heart of his 
administration’s policy-making process.19 However, it also moves beyond the 
Eisenhower – John Foster Dulles nexus by highlighting the importance of other officials 
and departments within the Washington bureaucracy that contributed to the policy 
process – including the Assistant Secretaries of State for Latin America, the Departments 
of State, Defense, Treasury, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Operations Coordinating 
Board, and semi-official organizations and institutions like the Export-Import Bank, the 
International Cooperation Administration, and the Foreign Operations Administration. 
Furthermore, it will support those scholars who have sought to critique the 
administration’s policies toward the Third World, arguing that the clash between the 
global priorities of the Cold War did not sit comfortably with the local dynamic of U.S.-
Latin American relations and suggesting that U.S. policy was far more multi-faceted and 
complex than has traditionally been stated.
20
 Finally, in further entrenching the role that 
private investment was expected to play in driving Latin American development, the 
Eisenhower administration would presage the dichotomy that would hinder the Alliance 
for Progress so severely during the 1960s.
21
 
                
 
  
AN EMERGING TENSION: ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN U.S. 
POLICY BEFORE 1956 
The idealistic principles underpinning the U.S. approach toward Latin America 
were outlined by President Eisenhower in a speech he gave before the OAS on April 15, 
1953.
22
  
Ours is an historic and meaningful unity. It is triumphant testimony…that 
peace and trust and fellowship can rule the conduct of all nations…I know 
that these facts, these simple ideals, are not new. But they are given a new, 
sharp meaning, by the nature of the tension tormenting our whole world… I 
do not think it unjust to claim for the government and the people of the 
United States a readiness, rarely matched in history, to help other nations 
improve their living standards and guard their security…23 
 
What was most striking about Eisenhower’s address before the OAS, however, is 
that it did not form the blueprint for his administration’s policies in Latin America.24 
Whilst Eisenhower would proclaim the U.S. willingness to “help other nations to 
improve their living standards and guard their security,” actual U.S. policy would not 
prove as coherent in aim or, indeed, application. Throughout its time in office, the 
administration would never manage to satisfactorily outline just how economic ideals – 
such as promoting Latin American growth through foreign private investment – could be 
pursued at the same time as strategic necessities – such as supporting authoritarian and 
repressive regimes. In global terms, the administration’s economic aims were clear 
enough: national security policy would be intended to cut deficits, maintain a strong 
dollar and generate economic development through private investment.
25
 Or, as Burton 
Kafuman has put it: “Foreign economic policy would rest on the secure foundations of 
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lower tariffs and private investments abroad. These, and not public capital, would meet 
the world’s economic needs and assure world economic prosperity.”26 But this model 
became problematic when applied to a relatively undeveloped area like Latin America. 
Strategic and economic objectives were not easily pursued simultaneously in areas 
lacking economic or political development; where building a strong bilateral relationship 
could mean supporting an undemocratic and corrupt regime. The solution, according to 
U.S. officials, lay in economic development funded by foreign private investment. 
In trying to meet these variable objectives in Latin America a successful trade 
policy was deemed crucial. A paper produced by the sub-committee charged with 
determining U.S. policy at the Rio de Janeiro Economic Conference in late-1954 noted, 
“It is the policy of the United States to avoid large economic grant aid programmes. 
Thus, to achieve strong economies the American Republics must rely principally on the 
normal factors of international and domestic commerce.”27 This approach, according to 
the president, should be an abiding feature of U.S. policy, irrespective of the wider 
geopolitical context. As he told his brother, Milton, in 1954, “in the case of South 
America we want to establish a healthy relationship that will be characterized by mutual 
cooperation and which will permanently endure. This will apply whether or not the 
Communist menace seems to increase or decrease in intensity.”28  
 Thus, the administration’s first policy document for the region – NSC 144/1 
finalized in March 1953 – outlined an economic policy that was intended to galvanize 
Latin American development without the use of “grant aid or soft loans.”29 The lending 
capacity of the Export-Import Bank would initially be reduced, with the administration 
preferring to channel development loans through the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
30
 Eisenhower’s preference for the IBRD came 
from the fact that its lending policy was based on strict banking principles, with loans 
only being released once a stringent set of economic criteria had been met.
31
 Following 
Milton Eisenhower’s tour of the region in 1953, however, the administration relented and 
allowed the Export-Import Bank to increase its level of funding in Latin America.
32
 This 
slight modification came from the recognition that the undiversified, capital-poor 
economies of Latin America were beginning to stagnate following a period of impressive 
growth after World War Two. The recommended solution, as outlined in NSC 5407 in 
February 1954, was to help guide development through realistic expectations, the 
attraction of capital investment and an increased level of technical advancement.
33
  
  
 At the heart of the administration’s policy was the assumption that economic 
modernization would eventually lead to a region that was pro-U.S. and democratic. This 
stance was conditioned by the absence of any overt (or even likely) Soviet threat in the 
Western Hemisphere.
34
 It was, however, being implemented in the face of a rising tide of 
anti-American sentiment in the region, which stemmed from a rapidly emerging desire to 
be free from U.S. economic supremacy.
35
 NSC 144/1 recognized that there was a 
growing movement throughout Latin America calling for improved living standards and 
an end to poverty.
36
 And the annex that fed into that document was even more explicit 
about the causes of such discontent. “The people of Latin America are becoming 
increasingly aware that 90% of the wealth of the Western Hemisphere (less Canada) is 
produced by one of the American republics – the United States – while 10% is produced 
by the remaining 20 American states,” noted the report.37 Such disparity was inevitably 
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breeding resentment and, as a result, “a doctrine labeled ‘nationalism’ or ‘colonialism’ 
has gained wide popular acceptance in the area.”38 
In spite of this, though, the administration’s economic approach toward Latin 
America prior to 1956 would be characterized by an enduring constancy and continuing 
faith in the potential of the free market system to meet U.S. objectives. This belief 
persisted even when initial results were disappointing.
39
 A key economic clause in NSC 
144/1 noted that, “the United States should encourage the institution of necessary Latin 
American government fiscal, budgetary and other measures which are indispensible to 
economic progress in the area through utilization of the International Monetary Fund, the 
International Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and other appropriate means.”40 Similar 
sentiments were apparent in U.S. lending policy. A paper produced by a sub-cabinet 
committee in preparation for the Rio de Janeiro conference in 1954 stressed, “In 
considering loan applications, the United States will view more favorably those where 
the proponent country has taken measures that are designed to improve the investment 
climate and has adopted practices to stabilize and strengthen its economy from an 
investment standpoint.”41  
But tensions were beginning to emerge; especially with respect to U.S. policies 
toward Guatemala. Throughout 1953 and the early months of 1954, the Guatemalan 
leader – Jacobo Arbenz – continued to pursue a radical economic and social agenda in 
direct contravention to American interests. As the situation became more pressing, U.S. 
officials sought to obtain a mandate from the OAS legitimizing action against Arbenz at 
the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March, 1954.
42
 Predictably, though, 
the aims of the Latin American nations were centered on economic issues instead,
43
 and 
their intransigence complicated U.S. efforts to attain an anti-communist resolution. “It 
had not been easy”, complained Foster Dulles to the NSC, confessing that he had 
“encountered much unhappiness and anxiety with respect to the commercial and 
financial policies which the administration was following in Latin America.”44 In order 
to obtain a watered down resolution in the face of Latin American antipathy at Caracas, 
Dulles had been forced to agree to U.S. participation at another inter-American 
conference (this time to discuss economic issues) to be held in Rio de Janeiro later that 
year.
45
 This concession, though slight, raised hopes among the governments of the region 
that a meaningful discussion on economic issues might finally take place.
46
 During a 
discussion at a meeting of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in June 1954, 
Marion Hardesty told the FOA head, Harold Stassen, that the Latin Americans had three 
objectives for the forthcoming conference in Rio de Janeiro: “The first is psychological – 
they want the U.S. to give them treatment in development financing that is equal to that 
given to other areas of the world; second, the formation of a Pan American Bank, and 
third a floor under prices paid for their commodities.”47 However, whilst many U.S. 
officials recognized the desirability of taking a more accommodating position toward 
Latin American requests at Rio, they were determined to do so in a manner that was in 
keeping with American principles.
48
 The prevailing sentiment was captured by Assistant 
Secretary Henry Holland in a memo to his deputy, Robert Woodward. “I state that we 
believe in the private enterprise system,” attested Holland. “Not because of any peculiar 
sanctity, but because it has demonstrated itself to be the best vehicle for efficient 
production of goods and services yet known...the bulk of the capital needed for economic 
development should come from private sources.”49 
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NSC 5432/1 – finalized in advance of the Rio Conference – reaffirmed long-
standing economic principles.
50
 The IBRD and the Export-Import Bank would be used to 
finance “sound projects” – that is development proposals that private funding was not 
available for; that were economically sound; and, whose amounts were in accordance 
with institutional guidelines
51
 – whilst aid payments would be used only in situations that 
could be described as “urgent.”52 This mixture of ‘trade and loans’ met some resistance 
within the administration – both from groups that thought it was too lenient and those 
that thought it did not go far enough. The Treasury Department headed those officials 
believing the new policy to be too liberal, whilst Harold Stassen and the FOA (although 
with some support from State, Defense and the CIA) thought the U.S. could perhaps 
implement more changes. The policy outlined in NSC 5432/1 did not go as far in altering 
U.S. policy as advocated by Harold Stassen and the FOA. It was, however, a 
compromise from the arch-conservative view put forward by the Treasury Department. 
The options were outlined by Assistant Secretary of State, Henry Holland, to the NSC at 
the September 2 meeting, when he noted that his committee had “identified three levels 
of Government financing for Latin America”: “(1) a very restricted policy of Export-
Import Bank loans; (2) a middle-of-the-road approach along the lines of NSC 5432...; 
and (3) the liberal policy described earlier in the meeting by Governor Stassen.” In light 
of the debate over the draft version of NSC 5432, Holland stated his belief that, 
“vigorous implementation of NSC 5432 would result in a realization of U.S. objectives 
in Latin America.”53 Thus, at the Rio Conference in November, the U.S. delegation – 
led, controversially, by Treasury Secretary Humphrey – would systematically refuse to 
engage with Latin American proposals and singularly refused to countenance any change 
in economic policy. 
By the time that the Soviet Union launched its economic offensive in Latin 
America in January, 1956, the Eisenhower administration was fully committed to the 
economic-centric policy that it had been pursuing in the region since early-1953. 
Assuredly, strategic and military assistance policies played a feature role, too, but the key 
objective for the administration was the importance attached to fostering Latin American 
development through the widespread expansion of free market capitalism. However, 
problems with the administration’s approach had begun to emerge during its attempts to 
oust Arbenz from power. Internal debates over the future course of U.S. policy had 
highlighted the growing need for a reappraisal of U.S. policy in Latin America. 
Furthermore, while Washington remained intransigent, anti-American sentiment in Latin 
America was on the rise. Robert Woodward, the Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, had outlined this in a memorandum in June, 1954. “Insufficient 
attention has been given within the U.S. government to the interests and problems of the 
Latin American countries as a whole,” Woodward noted. “There are continuing sources 
of irritation within the hemisphere which are exploitable for Communist propaganda 
purposes...it is important to take early action to eliminate or reduce these causes of 
friction.”54 In early-1956, these sources of friction would come to the fore and challenge 
the Eisenhower administration to make a decision as to the future direction of U.S. policy 
in Latin America. 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESS: THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SEO AND THE 
PANAMA PRESIDENTS MEETING 
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The worldwide Soviet Economic Offensive demonstrated an increasing 
conviction within the Soviet leadership to improve Moscow’s position with respect to 
foreign affairs, make the USSR safe from presumed capitalist hostility and expand Soviet 
influence in the Third World.
55
 Evidence of this could be seen in the Soviet agreement to 
provide $727 million worth of industrial aid to China and, also, in their attempts to forge 
alliances based on economic assistance with India and Egypt.
56
 In fact, the total figure of 
Soviet trade with underdeveloped countries increased from $850 million in 1954 to $1.44 
billion in 1956.
57
 Such high-profile policies were typical of Khrushchev’s approach to 
foreign affairs. William Taubman argues that his pursuit of a U.S.-Soviet détente was 
designed to, “undermine Western resistance to communist gains, tempt capitalists to 
increase East-West trade, and project a friendlier image in the Third World.”58 However, 
Khrushchev’s approach to foreign policy did not silence his domestic critics and, by June 
1957, he was coming under increasing fire from his colleagues in the Soviet Central 
Committee and faced a growing challenge to his premiership.
59
  
Meanwhile, Soviet actions were being viewed with some alarm in Washington.
60
 
In conversation with the British Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State 
Dulles informed him, we are “now faced with a situation in which a totalitarian power 
was operating in competition with a free world economic system,” and was “trying to 
wreck the West through economic competition.”61 Similarly, at the NSC Meeting on 
May 10 1956, Eisenhower forcefully outlined the way that Moscow was managing to 
exploit the capitalist system: “The Soviets [are] engaged in the great game of 
international politics, and in that game they didn’t have to show a cent of financial 
profit.” He went on to express “great concern” about the progress being made by the 
USSR and openly mused, “Whether we are going to wake up some morning and 
find...that Egypt has slipped behind the Iron Curtain.”62 Clearly (and understandably), 
the administration was concerned about the potential impact that the shift in Soviet 
policy might have on U.S. interests.
63
 A study prepared by the Policy Planning Staff in 
April noted that whilst anti-American sentiments in many underdeveloped countries 
were a result of nationalism rather than communism, “the Soviet challenge” did make 
“necessary a review of U.S. economic policy.”64 This sentiment was repeated by Foster 
Dulles in a letter to Treasury Secretary, George Humphrey. “I believe,” he wrote, “that 
the present Soviet economic offensive requires a general re-examination of our aid 
programs to determine whether they are as effective as they might be.”65 Whilst the SEO 
was not the only factor behind this reappraisal, it was a major catalyst. In due course, the 
administration would make alterations to the Mutual Security Program (MSP) and, also, 
create the Development Loan Fund as a new avenue of available funding for capital-
hungry Third World nations.
66
 That the White House had to battle with a parsimonious 
Congress to introduce these changes only served to illustrate the administration’s 
determination to address the problems posed by the SEO.
67
  
However, in doing so the administration was adamant that it would not be drawn 
into a tit-for-tat competition with Moscow. A major part of the administration’s response 
would be focused on a far more strident implementation of Washington’s economic 
policies regarding free trade and investment.
68
 This would be matched by an intense 
psychological operation to boost the public image of the U.S. whilst, at the same time, 
undermining any progress made by the USSR.
69
 But it was the economic aspect of this 
response that was most telling. Although Moscow’s actions had blurred the previous 
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distinctions between economic development and national security, the Eisenhower 
administration retained an innate belief that an improvement in implementing its 
economic strategies could play a significant role in countering the Soviet threat.
70
 The 
centrality of this idea in American policy was outlined in a position paper  produced at 
the Princeton Conference in 1954: 
The growth of the free world economy is important to us for much more 
than economic reasons. We believe material progress to be a necessary 
foundation for more far reaching American aspirations for a civilization in 
which human dignity, freedom, and respect for the individual can flourish, 
and in which societies based on these principles can effectively defend 
themselves…71 
This was outlined more specifically in terms of a response to the SEO in a working paper 
produced by a Council on Foreign Relations Study Group. “Our main aim is to help 
promote sound economic development over the long run,” stated the paper. “The 
Russians can gain short run political advantage by the way they handle their 
development policies and by choosing popular and spectacular projects for aid...it should 
be countered by other means than manipulating our aid policy.”72  
 Prior to Bulganin’s offer of economic assistance to the Latin American nations in 
January, 1956, there had been some discussion within the Eisenhower administration as 
to the potential danger of an increased Soviet presence in the region. A National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in late-1955 warned that the combination of increased Soviet 
activity and existing social and economic pressures was liable to, “subject the inter-
American system to new strains and adversely affect political, economic and military 
cooperation with the United States.”73More troubling was the argument outlined in a 
report generated within the Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which noted that any 
increase in Soviet activity in the region was evidence of the “alertness of the Soviets to 
exploit Latin American complaints against American economic policies.”74 Thus, when 
Bulganin made his offer to the Latin American nations, the view in Washington was that 
the Kremlin was seeking to take advantage of existing problems in the inter-American 
relationship.  
Yet the SEO was more than an economic challenge to the U.S. Coming in both an 
election year and at the end of a period when Eisenhower had continually extolled the 
Guatemalan people’s rejection of communist ideology, the Soviet offer was also 
politically problematic for the U.S.
75
Therefore, in meeting the Soviet challenge, any U.S. 
response had to consider both the economic and political aspects of the SEO, as well as 
balancing the local dynamics of the inter-American relationship with the global 
exigencies of the Cold War. In its attempts to react swiftly and decisively to the Soviet 
move, the Eisenhower administration would forsake the opportunity to implement real 
and lasting changes to the fabric of the inter-American relationship, opting instead, for a 
short-term solution that would neutralize the impact of the SEO. This decision – which 
saw more emphasis placed on intra-hemispheric cooperation, improved military 
assistance schemes and more strident implementation of existing economic ideals – 
would irrevocably commit the United States to following a course of policy in Latin 
America that was intrinsically linked to the edicts of free market capitalism. The precise 
nature of the U.S. response to the SEO in Latin America was outlined at the Panama 
Presidents Meeting in August, 1956. However, once the initial goodwill generated by 
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this meeting had subsided, the U.S. would be confronted by a rapid and inexorable rise in 
anti-American sentiment in the region; fuelled, in the main, by the administration’s 
refusal to significantly alter its economic policies. 
  
 In Washington, the immediate impact of the SEO was highly apparent. In 
February, 1956, Henry Holland, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, highlighted its impact in a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, highlighting the 
strategic worth of a potential commodity agreement between the U.S. and the Latin 
Americans. “Today,” noted Holland, “a coffee agreement would be a political implement 
giving the U.S. enormous influence over the reactions of the Latin American 
governments to the current Soviet diplomatic and economic campaign in this 
hemisphere.” Holland believed that a commodity agreement would give the U.S. the 
necessary leverage to influence Latin American policy, without contravening its 
economic principles. “We need something new that does not involve broad grant aid, soft 
loans, loans to the oil industry or loans to projects for which private capital is available,” 
he wrote.
76
 “We must put the other country in a position where it is obvious to her that if 
she accepts Soviet credits we can quietly diminish or cut off continuing benefits which 
are more important to her than anything Russia can offer.” Ultimately, “we now have a 
new challenge, and I do not believe our existing policies will meet it,” Holland informed 
Dulles.
77
  
 A similarly urgent appraisal was being applied to the activities of the Export-
Import Bank. The Bank’s lending programs had been a source of concern for U.S. 
officials since November, 1954 when, at the Rio Conference, the U.S. delegation had 
made assurances to the Latin American nations that the amounts being invested by the 
Bank would increase dramatically. By late-1955 this had not occurred. “The level of 
lending should be at least the minimum amount necessary to keep the Latin Americans 
from complaining,” Henry Holland told an economic sub-committee in December, 1955. 
“We have led them to believe that ‘substantial results’ will be realized, and if we do not 
live up to this, there will be intense complaints.”78 This process was given an added fillip 
by the SEO. On January 17, 1956, Holland repeated his sentiments in a memorandum to 
Foster Dulles and Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover Jr, before adding: “Our 
whole economic policy in the area is built around this commitment, yet we are clearly 
failing to keep it...the whole problem has been rendered much more acute by the Soviet 
campaign in the area.”79 Acting on his lieutenant’s instructions, Dulles informed Samuel 
Waugh (President of the Export-Import Bank) that he was concerned “as to whether the 
operations of the Export-Import Bank in the area will be of [a] volume sufficient to serve 
as an effective defense against the Russian campaign.”80 
 Whilst these examples illustrate the immediate effect of the SEO, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the wider response formulated by U.S. policymakers. In broad terms, the 
administration’s response was to emphasize its strategic objectives in the region.81 In 
March, an OCB Progress Report cautioned that Bulganin’s offer was, “the Soviet Union’s 
most important policy statement on Latin America to date.” While the report was not 
explicit about a recommended response, it did recognize that, “the Soviet offensive lends 
urgency to the need to stimulate among the Latin American governments and people an 
understanding of the threat posed by international communism and a determination to 
control it.” Moreover, it outlined what was to become a central part of the 
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administration’s attempt to counter the SEO: “The necessity to associate the United States 
with the aspirations of the Latin American people to a greater extent,” coupled with the 
need to counter communist propaganda, “portraying the United States as the imperialist 
exploiter of the peoples and resources of the area.”82   
 Two weeks later, an “Outline Plan of Operations against Communism in Latin 
America,” set out the retort to the SEO in more detail. It stated that U.S. actions would be 
based on: 
(1) Preservation with all governments of cooperative constructive friendly 
relations... (2) Continuous demonstration in Latin America of the vigor and 
resourcefulness of U.S. policy and technology, and the high levels of 
morality and democracy... (3) Maximum effort to associate communism 
with subversion...and (4) the use of appropriate OAS, UN and other 
multilateral, as well as bilateral, action in combating it.
83
 
An essential part of this policy would be in strengthening the ties between the U.S. and 
the Latin Americans. Washington, the report stated, should keep in mind its “power to 
weaken communism by strengthening and improving the welfare of Latin American 
governments and peoples and by drawing close the political, economic, psychological, 
spiritual and military bonds of Latin American governments and peoples with the United 
States and the West.”84 Meeting the Soviet challenge did not, according to the OCB and 
leading officials within the administration necessitate a change in economic policy. 
Instead, economic policies would be implemented more stridently, military assistance 
policies would be improved and, most importantly, the U.S. would make a far greater 
effort to foster Pan-American harmony by consulting the Latin American nations more 
often through the OAS. The administration was clearly placing immediate Cold War 
concerns ahead of the chorus of Latin American public opinion demanding significant 
changes in U.S. economic policy. 
 A demonstration of how this approach translated into actual policy came at the 
Panama Presidents Meeting in August, 1956. The meeting was timed to coincide with the 
one-hundred-and-thirtieth anniversary of the first Pan-American Congress, and was 
intended as a ceremonial forum at which Eisenhower could visit Latin America, bestow 
his presence on the maximum number of leaders possible and significantly boost the 
standing of the United States in the region. In the wake of the SEO, U.S. officials saw the 
Panama Meeting as an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the healthy state of the inter-
American system. Prior to the meeting, Secretary Dulles cabled the U.S. diplomatic 
missions in the region and told them to, “interpret his [Eisenhower’s] presence [in] 
Panama as evidence [of the] importance U.S. attaches [to] its relations with Latin 
America.”85 Early drafts of a declaration for the meeting stressed this very point and 
called for an, “intensification of national and inter-American cooperative efforts to seek 
the solution of economic problems and to raise the standards of living on the continent.”86 
Furthermore, Eisenhower would go to Panama armed with a proposal for a multilateral 
committee – run through the OAS – which would meet to discuss hemispheric economic 
issues. Hugely popular, it gave the appearance of engaging with Latin American 
economic demands without committing the U.S. to any actual changes in policy. “My 
brother knew his proposal would meet with enthusiastic approval,” enthused Milton 
Eisenhower in 1963.
87
 In a memorandum detailing the proposed committee, Harold 
Randall, the U.S. Representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, 
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sketched out the benefits it would have for the U.S. As well as strengthening the prestige 
of the OAS and U.S.-Latin American relations, “the establishment of the Committee 
would,” Randall wrote, “constitute a significant deterrent to the current Soviet campaign 
for expansion of diplomatic and economic relations in Latin America.”88 The 
administration hailed the Panama Meeting as a triumph. “It was a great success from the 
standpoint of public relations,” noted the president in his diary.89 Nevertheless, whilst the 
meeting and the formation of the Presidents Committee had paid lip-service to Latin 
American economic proposals, this had been done purely for strategic purposes. Basic 
economic principles in the region remained unaltered. However, despite US intentions, 
Latin American expectations had been raised. In retrospect, noted Milton Eisenhower, the 
new committee was formulated with the “undue expectation that the United States would 
greatly increase its assistance to Latin America.”90 Consequently, the U.S. would find 
itself under severe pressure at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference a year later to 
expand upon the concessions made in Panama. Even as the immediate Soviet threat to the 
region was receding in late-1956, the changes made to U.S. policy were beginning a new 
phase in intra-hemispheric relations.  
 
 
HOLDING THE LINE: THE BUENOS AIRES ECONOMIC CONFERENCE  
 As Moscow’s offers of economic and technical assistance ran aground in late-
1956 – hindered by the poor quality of Soviet industrial products and the public relations 
disaster of sending the Red Army into Hungary in November
91
 – the Eisenhower 
administration continued its efforts to significantly improve the U.S. position in Latin 
America. For they were aware that the Soviets would be sure to come again; a prediction 
that was amply demonstrated in 1957 and 1958 as the Kremlin renewed its attempts to 
forge diplomatic and economic links throughout the Third World.
92
 More importantly, the 
SEO had highlighted the strategic frailties of the U.S. position in the region, which as the 
battle for “hearts and minds” in the Third World continued to intensify, needed to be 
addressed forthwith.
93
  
 In an effort to build on the achievements of the Panama Meeting, the 
administration produced NSC 5613/1 in September. A Briefing Paper prepared for the 
president described the major facets of this new policy statement:  
A. The Organization of American States is to be strengthened...this reflects 
the President’s proposal for strengthening the OAS made at the recent 
Panama meeting of the Presidents of the American Republics...B. Existing 
policy relies primarily on private trade and investment in the economic 
development of Latin America. These activities, particularly trade, are to be 
pushed more vigorously to forestall Soviet economic penetration.
94
  
At the NSC Meeting on September 6, the members debated a series of measures it was 
believed would help to shore-up the U.S. position in the region and preclude any future 
Soviet incursions. Secretary Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, argued over the best way of improving U.S. military assistance policies, 
whilst a further discussion focused on the language outlining the lending policies of the 
Export-Import Bank. As well as these suggestions the Joint Chiefs of Staff also insisted 
that a passage be included that committed the U.S. to “employ appropriate political, 
military and economic measures” if “a Latin American state should establish with the 
 12 
Soviet bloc close ties of such a nature as to seriously prejudice” American interests.95 In 
the document itself, however, the administration’s enduring faith in the capacity of 
foreign private investment to improve inter-American relations was clearly apparent. It 
stated: 
The Soviet overtures only serve to emphasize the urgency and necessity of 
carrying out U.S. policies vigorously, especially loan and trade policies, in 
order to demonstrate the benefits to be derived from a free private enterprise 
system and from close relations with the United States. 
Washington would also increase the amount it spent in the region. In the financial 
appendix to the document, the administration’s outlay was projected to rise from $80.8 
million in 1955 to $160 million in 1958, with the majority of these further funds being 
apportioned to military assistance, the construction of an inter-American highway and 
improved information service programs.
96
 Following the finalizing of NSC 5613/1, the 
OCB prepared an “Outline Plan of Operations,” which brought all of this together and 
stressed that it was: “Essential that the U.S. defeat the Communist intention of 
penetrating and subverting the American states, and to maintain close and friendly 
relations with these nations.”97  
This response to the SEO was very much in keeping with the administration’s 
global rejoinder. Tensions within this policy, though, were beginning to emerge. When 
the plan of operations was finalized in April, 1957, there was a frank recognition that 
Latin American unhappiness with U.S. economic policy was growing and needed to be 
addressed. Feelings that the U.S. was neglecting and underfunding the region could not 
“be overlooked” the report stated, “Since they come into head-on collision with the basis 
of current U.S. economic policy with respect to Latin America.”98 But, by September, 
this did not seem to require an immediate solution: the U.S. response to the SEO 
appeared to have been successful. “The Soviet bloc,” an NSC Progress Report noted, 
“has not increased its influence in the area,” whilst levels of trade between the Soviet 
bloc and Latin America had receded.
99
 This perception of success, however, obscured a 
significant problem with NSC 5613/1: the document did not specifically clarify just how 
the U.S. could achieve its strategic aim of improving U.S.-Latin American relations 
whilst also adhering to its long-standing economic principles.  
 As a political tool, the creation of the inter-American committee at the Panama 
Presidents Meeting had been hugely popular with the Latin American nations.
100
 
However, it raised expectations in the region that more meaningful changes in U.S. 
policy might be imminent; when these did not emerge, significant problems began to 
develop. Although U.S. policymakers were aware of the economic problems in Latin 
America, the SEO had not provided the catalyst for any significant change in economic 
policy.
101
 Therefore, while the approach taken in Panama had successfully obviated the 
immediate danger posed by the SEO, it had not addressed the abiding tension in U.S.-
Latin American relations over development policies. These problems would begin to 
come to the fore at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference in August, 1957. 
 
Prior to the Conference, changes in government personnel had raised the 
possibility of a more lenient policy. Treasury Secretary, George Humphrey, and 
Assistant Secretary of State, Henry Holland, had both left the administration to return to 
the private sector and were replaced by Robert Anderson and Roy Rubottom.
102
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Anderson and Rubottom – along with Thomas Mann and Douglas Dillon (as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Deputy Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs) – were part of an influx of officials that were more open to the idea of 
relaxing U.S. economic policy.
103
 However, although the administration did moderate its 
position on commodity agreements, increase lending through the Export-Import Bank 
and inaugurate a new Inter-American Development Bank,
104
 it did not relax its stance 
with respect to the necessity of structuring Latin American development through foreign 
private investment.
105
  
Still, U.S. officials knew that they were likely to come under severe pressure from 
the Latin American delegates at Buenos Aires. “At the Conference,” Roy Rubottom 
wrote to Douglas Dillon, “we can...expect to have a difficult task of negotiations due to 
the continuing impossibility of our acceding to Latin demands for money and measures 
that they say they need for economic development.”106 In anticipation of the Conference, 
the Latin American nations had issued an Inter-American Economic Agreement (that the 
U.S. had agreed to discuss). Despite the post-SEO changes, U.S. policymakers were 
highly skeptical about the merits of the draft agreement. At a meeting held in the 
Treasury Department, it became evident that Treasury officials still had “very serious 
doubts” as to whether the U.S. “should undertake to negotiate with the Latin American 
governments on a text of the kind drafted by the Secretariat of the Pan American Union.” 
As Rubottom noted in the minutes of the meeting, though, the U.S. had agreed to 
negotiate on the agreement at Buenos Aires, and therefore,  
We should not hesitate to decide our position and then negotiate it as 
strongly and as effectively as possible… it was unlikely that the Latin 
American countries would be satisfied with another declaration or that it 
would fulfill our commitment to negotiate for an agreement.
107
 
 
Rubottom recognized that to adopt the same stance as at the Rio Conference in 
1954 would not placate Latin American demands and would inflame nationalist and anti-
American sentiment in the region. Despite Rubottom’s arguments, though, the final 
recommendation of the sub-committee set up to formulate U.S. policy for the Conference 
was: “The U.S. platform at Buenos Aires should be the same as at Rio – a strong 
presentation of the benefits of private investment and free private investment.”108 The 
historiography dealing with this period has not sufficiently examined the 
administration’s unwillingness to alter its approach for the Buenos Aires Conference.109 
Yet doing so is of central importance in recognizing the importance of the SEO when 
considering the evolution of U.S.-Latin American relations during the Eisenhower era. 
Although national security imperatives had assumed far more importance in U.S. policy, 
traditional economic principles remained unaltered and still exerted a strong influence. 
The dichotomy between the strategic need for regional harmony and traditional 
reticence with regard to altering U.S. economic policies was summarized by Douglas 
Dillon at a State Department meeting on June 28. After beginning by stating that the U.S. 
should look to adopt a “positive and accommodating position,” Dillon then seemed to 
recant this by noting: “Since it may not be possible for the Latin Americans and us to 
reach accord on a General Inter-American Economic Agreement, we may wish to 
suggest at the Conference that, instead of a treaty, convention, or agreement, the 
delegates prepare a declaration or resolution.”110 Despite recognizing that adopting such 
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a stance was not consistent with the aim of strengthening inter-American relations, the 
U.S. position for the Buenos Aires Conference was one predicated almost entirely on 
long-standing economic aims. In fact, the Conference’s final communiqué ended up, 
“reaffirming” U.S. economic policy, as the American delegation “refused to accept Latin 
American proposals and forced the delegates to accept a final treaty that did not in any 
way alter the status quo.”111  
Publicly, the administration was forced to proclaim the Conference a triumph. 
One reporter asked Roy Rubottom whether “it was…a disaster for us?” “On the 
contrary,” Rubottom replied, “I think we came out of the Conference very well. I think 
that we consider that the Conference was a success.”112 However, the internal 
discussions held beforehand had expressed a degree of hesitancy with regard to the 
proposed U.S. position. These concerns were well founded. By November, 1957, Milton 
Eisenhower was writing to Rubottom expressing his dismay at the plummeting U.S. 
reputation in Latin America. “I take it,” he wrote, “that our relations with most of the 
nations of Latin America are degenerating, and that this is happening primarily because 
they continue to feel we are disproportionately helping other areas of the world 
financially.”113 While the short-term measures introduced to counter the SEO had been 
relatively successful, the absence of any comparable shift in economic policy had 
undermined the stability of U.S.-Latin American relations. 
 Both before and after the Conference, officials like Dillon and Rubottom had 
realized that by continuing to stymie any alterations in policy, the U.S. was hampering its 
chances of achieving its strategic aims in the region.
114
 However, U.S. ideological 
constructs dictated that strategic imperatives would still have to be attained in a manner 
in keeping with the ideals of free market capitalism.
115
  Consequently, deep Latin 
American dissatisfaction with U.S. policies would continue to develop, and the main 
strategic goal of the administration in the region – to significantly improve inter-
American relations – would remain unattained. The waning threat posed by Moscow 
allowed Eisenhower a degree of leeway; but the shift toward a new phase in U.S.-Latin 
American relations had clearly begun. With rising discontent leading to political 
instability, the U.S. position in the region was coming under increasing threat. Indeed, in 
December 1958, a National Intelligence Estimate confirmed what several leading 
officials already knew, stating: “Political instability in Latin America will continue as a 
major obstacle to improvement in relations with the United States.”116 The course of 
inter-American relations had gone beyond the strategic challenges posed by the SEO. By 
failing to recognize this fact in the eighteen months after Bulganin’s offer in January, 
1956, the Eisenhower administration had entrenched a dichotomy between national 
security and economic development onto U.S.-Latin American relations that would have 
a long-lasting impact on inter-American relations.  
 
The events of Vice President Richard Nixon’s tour of Latin America in the spring 
of 1958, when anti-American sentiment emerged at its most fervent, demonstrated the 
impact that this period had upon U.S.-Latin American relations.
117
 Upon arriving in 
Caracas, Venezuela, Nixon’s entourage was greeted by a “group made up of ruffians and 
riffraff”; “for fourteen agonizing minutes Nixon and his wife sat trapped in their separate 
limousines while the press captured an occurrence unique in U.S. history – enraged 
demonstrators spitting on the Vice President of the United States.”118 This was a 
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damning indictment of Washington’s response to the SEO: although the immediate 
strategic threat had been met, policies which were supposed to significantly improve the 
U.S. position in the region had quite clearly failed. As Alan McPherson has written, 
“Whatever else this was, most witnesses agreed, it was anti-Americanism – unbridled 
hostility toward the United States.”119 Consequently, an OCB report produced in June, 
1958, detailed that, “growing operational difficulties, present and prospective, with 
respect to the trends among the peoples of the area point to the need for a close scrutiny 
of these policies and programs.”120  
These “growing difficulties” can be traced back to the period following the SEO 
and the changes that occurred in U.S. policy. To be sure, these changes were not 
particularly revolutionary, but they did prove to be successful in meeting the immediate 
strategic threat posed by Moscow. And yet crucially, this shift in policy brought to the 
surface long-simmering tensions in U.S.-Latin American relations: by prioritizing its 
strategic aims in the region and failing to address the economic grievances of the Latin 
Americans, the Eisenhower administration inadvertently undermined the long-term 
stability of the U.S. position. This has two significant consequences for our 
understanding of this topic. 
Firstly, the evidence presented here challenges the contention of Eisenhower 
Revisionists who argue that the president (and his administration) had a clear conception 
of what they wanted to achieve and that this consistently formed the basis of its policies 
throughout its time in office. From January 1956 onwards, the U.S. was put into a 
position of reacting toward emerging strategic threats rather than following a pre-existing 
set of policy objectives. This is of significance with regard to the existing historiography 
on U.S.-Latin American relations. For the administration’s Latin American policies did 
not adhere to a singular objective throughout its time in office. In fact, the abiding 
feature of U.S. policy toward Latin America in the Eisenhower era is of an 
administration attempting to balance its strategic and economic objectives in the face of 
competing interests. It was the Soviet Economic Offensive that brought this challenge to 
the fore. In broader terms this argument moves beyond traditional constructs regarding 
the role of economic factors in American ideology. Whilst it concurs that U.S. 
policymakers were inexorably committed to long-standing economic principles in the 
region, it also demonstrates that strategic interests – and especially the need to be seen to 
be winning the Cold War – were an equally important facet of Washington’s ideological 
conception of the region.
121
 
Secondly, the present article expands our knowledge about the dynamics of inter-
American relations during the 1950s. In responding to the SEO, U.S. officials attempted 
to impose hemispheric unity upon the region without relaxing their position on those 
issues considered vital by the Latin American governments. Whilst the Latin Americans 
wanted a strong partnership with the U.S., they wanted it to be one that was based on 
wide-ranging economic assistance from Washington in order to aid development. This 
was too radical a step for U.S. officials, though, and U.S. policies fell far short of 
meeting the Latin American agenda.
122
 This trend underpinned the events at the Buenos 
Aires Conference, where the disparity between the positions of the Latin Americans and 
the U.S. was demonstrably clear. Any concessions made by Washington in the post-1956 
period were in order to meet pressing strategic concerns only. This point was driven 
home in the period after the Buenos Aires Conference when, with the U.S. coming under 
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increasing diplomatic pressure to agree to an Inter-American Economic Agreement, John 
Dreier, the U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, wrote in a memorandum: “I believe...we 
should take another look at drafting a harmless economic agreement which we could 
urge the Senate to ratify for political purposes.”123 Though the role of the Latin American 
nations was of obvious importance, it was still Washington that had the final say and 
drove the policy process.
124
 
  Ultimately, were it not for the emergence of the SEO in Latin America and the 
subsequent failings of the U.S. response, it is difficult to see later changes in policy being 
as radical as they turned out to be. The actions taken by U.S. policymakers in order to 
counter the SEO began a process of evolving change in American policy. As Milton 
Eisenhower wrote in 1963, “The stage was set – somewhat inadvertently – for the 
initiation, almost imperceptible at first but reaching a crescendo in 1958, 1959, and 1960, 
of dramatic and beneficial changes in United States-Latin American relations.”125 When 
the administration came to reassess U.S. policy in the wake of the Nixon trip, leading 
officials were appreciative of the fact that they needed to go beyond those changes that 
had been made in response to the SEO in 1956. Even then, new policies such as the 
creation of an Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 1959 and a Social Progress 
Fund a year later remained rooted in traditional American ideals with regard to economic 
beliefs.
126
 In fact, in the administration’s final proposal for the IADB, the U.S. insisted 
upon “maintaining our long standing principles with respect to avoiding excessive 
competition with private enterprise.”127 
In the Eisenhower administration’s failure to negotiate this tension between 
economic idealism and strategic realism lay the seeds of future difficulties for policy 
toward Latin America. On March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy, “called on all 
people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress – Alianzo para Progresso 
– a vast, cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy 
the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools.”128 
And yet, in attempting to implement the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy 
administration would find its efforts severely hindered by what Michael Latham has 
termed the tension “between containment and development.”129 To its eventual cost, the 
Kennedy administration – as had the Eisenhower administration before it – found that it 
was intensely difficult to pursue an idealistic vision of Latin American economic 
development at the same time as maintaining a strong stance on national security. Neither 
Eisenhower nor Kennedy proved able to bridge this gap; an inability that was 
predominantly driven by both men’s ideological commitment to the two central features 
of US policy in the region. All of which leaves us with the words of Stephen Rabe who, 
in outlining the reasons for the failure of the Alliance for Progress, offers an analysis  that 
is equally applicable to the difficulties encountered by Dwight D. Eisenhower after 
January, 1956.  “President John F. Kennedy brought high ideals and noble purposes to his 
Latin American policy. Ironically, however, his unwavering determination to wage Cold 
War in the ‘most dangerous area in the world’ led him and his administration ultimately 
to compromise and even mutilate those grand goals.”130  
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